In pursuing the truth about a fire that's caused and continues to cause so much despair, disruption and cost to individuals and the public purse within and beyond Wye River–Separation Creek, to echo Minister Garett, "what are the learnings from this fire"?
Surely an important matter is how the Emergency Management Commissioner and DELWP decide on "inaccessibility" when it comes to fighting a fire in a forest.
In my blog posting of 3 February 2017 "Wye River–Separation Creek bushfire — fake news and alternative facts at play?" I provided information to support my contesting the "assertions of the Emergency Management Commissioner and Inspector-General for Emergency Management (IGEM) that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was ʻextremely difficult to accessʼ and arguing that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft".
Included in that posting are a series of photographs taken on driving into what I then considered was in close proximity to where the lightning strike reached the ground on 19 December 2015 and demonstrating by my presence that the area would not have been difficult nor too dangerous for fit and experienced DELWP firefighters.
Also in the posting are an extract from the 1:30 000 Vicmap Topographic Map of the area and other relevant maps and drawings:
Having finished exploring further east along the bulldozed track from where my vehicle was parked, I then went back to explore what lay down the trail indicated by the sign painted on the tree below.
As I walked down the trail it seemed soon to become a hand-made control line that would have been taken down to "mineral earth" or bare ground. The objective of the control line would have been to prevent the spread of a surface fire or be used as a base for burning out the grass, leaves and twigs: surface fine fuel between the fire edge and control line. It's the surface fine fuel that normally carries the fire front.
The control line would have been constructed as close to the fire edge as safely possible to minimise the size of the fire.
From my walk down the trail I recorded a few points with my GPS and took photographs. Concerning the GPS recordings, it's important to understand that the forest canopy and positions recorded increasingly further down the northern slope probably shielded some of the satellites able to be read, which will result in a reduced accuracy of the recordings. Nevertheless, I’m satisfied that they are sufficiently close for my purposes.
Following is an annotated Google Earth photo with Positions 6, 7, 8, and 9 that I’m confident mark the bulldozed that becomes the hand constructed control line put in place early, probably 19 and early on the 20th. Positions 10 and 11 are inside the fire edge east of the control line. I consider Position 11 is the approximate location of the lightning strike. More about this later.
Next, part of the 1:30 000 topographical map where I have located Position 11 from my GPS recording. Position 1 is where I parked my motor vehicle Position 2 is the location of the sign on the tree pointing to the hand trail (above.
Now a few photographs down the control line. The first is near the head of the control line and close Position 2 on the map. The fire area is to the right of the line. The second is further down the control line. The uninvolved area is to the left of the line. Important to understand that when the line was constructed it would have been cleared to “mineral earth” (bare ground).
Next, a view of the fire area east of the control line part way down towards position 9 on the Google Earth photo.
And further into the burnt area from the immediately preceding photograph.
Another view similar to the preceding photograph inside the fire area as I made my way to Positions 10 and 11 from Position 9 on the Google Earth photo and eventually back to Position 2.
On fire behaviour on the 19th and probably the 20th, the three preceding photographs show unburnt heavier fuels laying on the ground, much of which was in place before the fire. This indicates to me that the fire was not all that hot and it just “trickled” around, probably not all that affected by wind experienced that far downslope.
Finally, a photograph towards the northeast across the area where I feel the lighting strike occurred. Note the large burnt stump visible at left in the photograph.
And, on accessibility and density of vegetation working against effective fire attack while the fire was still small, my photographs don’t seem to support the assertion that the lightning strike that impacted just south of Jamieson Creek was "extremely difficult to access" and argued that the vegetation was too dense to respond to the efforts of firebombing aircraft. But you be the judge, I have my opinion.
As we shall see later, the fire eventually became enormous and ultimately led to the Wye River–Separation Creek catastrophe.
Don't be misled by the "spinners" folks, regardless of where and how the fire that caused that catastrophe came from on Christmas Day, it was the failure to quickly control and extinguish the fire caused by the lightning strike during those first few hours that was the underlying cause of what is now the Wye River–Separation Creek misery.
The Quadrant story A Tale of Two Fires by Mark Poynter provides a different view to those expressed by the IGEM and the Emergency Management Commissioner. You can decide for yourselves on who is most qualified.
Finally for now, the penultimate paragraph in Minister Garrett’s request to the IGEM:
I understand that you and your staff were in attendance at this fire over a number of days conducting monitoring and evaluation functions as part of your legislative role and that a number of observations were made relative to those issues listed above.
Is this statement correct? Does the IGEM have people at the fires currently burning in National Park west of Dargo in eastern Victoria, and further east in National Park at Wulgulmerang? Does the IGEM have people appropriately qualified and experienced to undertake such important work?
There are important matters that should be pursued by the Coroner, if she ever gets around to it. For example are there still people in critical fire management positions who should have been removed?
Will it eventually be found that Minister Garrett and the people of Victoria have been misled?
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