Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River-Jamieson Track fire — the potential folly of judging a book by its cover

On Thursday, 25 February, I posted the link to the Inspector–General for Emergency Management’s “Review of the initial response to the 2015 Wye River-Jamieson Track fire" (click here) with the comment that I was going to study it before commenting.

One of my interests is military history of certain eras and there are books I see from their covers that attract my attention. However, before I spend money and time on a book, I always check on the author and the reliability of the critics.

Before getting too deeply into the IGEMs review, I decided to check on the bona fides of the author and the reliability of the critics.

The review document

What knowledge and experience, particularly on-the-ground hands-on firefighting experience, should be expected of the author of such a review? Does the reviewer have that knowledge and experience?

How did the reviewer gather the information on which to base the work? Were all the "key players" interviewed and down to what level in the hierarchy of management did the review reach? Was the reviewer satisfied that the contributors spoke freely or openly or did they exhibit signs that they felt themselves constrained by concerns over career prospects or felt vulnerable when looking back over their actions and advice they gave during the firefight?

The critics

From their utterances reported in the media the Minister for Emergency Services and the Emergency Management Commissioner are leading critics of the review document.

What actual knowledge and hands-on experience of the subject do they possess — there seems to be some some confusion over the difference between steeply sloping terrain and a “gorge”, fire intensity Christmas Day and gaps in the knowledge of the availability of specialist on-the-ground firefighting capability in Victoria and across Australia (click here)?

Reference material

To learn more about the Office of the IGEM I’ve begun to study its web page (click here), including some of its reports (click here) and the Emergency Management Act (click here).

To date, analysing the reference materials is leading me to conclude that the government has a narrow view of bushfire emergency management in Victoria. For example, who monitors the performance of municipalities in satisfactorily meeting their town and settlement bushfire protection obligations and the performance of the CFA in meeting its fire prevention responsibilities? So far from my brief examination of the work of the Office of the IGEM that does not seem high on its agenda.

PPRR

Whatever happened to a risk assessment based approach to fully integrated Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery to bushfire emergency management?

Attempting to calm the the citizens of Victoria, many now unnerved because of the "leave and lose" bushfire survival policy, government boasts an armada of 53 aircraft to protect us. The reliance on so many aircraft at the response stage of a PPRR approach is an indicator of failure at the prevention and community preparedness stages of emergency management.

Fifty-three aircraft, up to the size of a McDonnell Douglas DC 10 that UPS uses for its international airfreight service! Yet, the Minister for Emergency Services, Emergency Management Commissioner and the Inspector–General for Emergency Management are all adamant that air attack was of little value as part of the initial response to the lightning strike due to the fire being in a "gorge" and dense tree canopy preventing the suppressing agent reaching the ground.

Does the Victorian government understand the limitations on air attack in Victoria?

Considering the retaining and flying costs involved with the large fixed wing aircraft alone, and consequently the enormous sum of money expended, would redirection of some of this money to risk assessment based bushfire “prevention” — including a full-time fire service responsible for specialist fire management on public land that would include year round readiness to undertake fuel reduction burning as the many “windows of opportunity” present on a daily basis somewhere in Victoria — and community “preparedness” achieve a better return on investment? I believe it would.

Some examples of the work done post Ash Wednesday 1983 that recommended a shift to what we now know as PPRR and preceding the 2009 Victorian bushfires and those that followed, including the devastation of Wye River–Separation Creek on Christmas Day 2015.

The first speaks for itself with two recommendations relating to “mitigation and preparedness" (click here).

The following should have been the start of a significant step forward into risk assessment based PPRR, with Foreword by Alan Hodges, AM, Director General, Emergency Management Australia (click here).

Finally, a national bushfire preparedness strategy, again with Foreword by Alan Hodges, AM, Director General, Emergency Management Australia (click here).

The first dot point on page 3 of the Executive Summary (click here) is worth noting when considering the efficacy of the current bushfire “leave and lose” policy of the Victorian government in a broader loss reduction context.

Incidentally, the cover photograph is a bushfire near Esperense, WA, February 1991. Has anything changed there?

Having considered the role and responsibilities of the Office of Inspector–General for Emergency Management and some of its work to ensure the protection of Victorians from bushfire it’s reasonable to ask, are EMV and IGEM “birds of a feather… “ and this review a case of “Caesar judging Caesar”?

To conclude, considering the work done from the lessons learned post-Ash Wednesday, there's an old adage, "if we don't learn from history we are doomed to repeat it". How many times has that been the situation since February 1983?